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Abstract
The paper assumes that fear presents a certain degree of ambivalence. To say
it with Hans Jonas (1903-1993), fear is not only a negative emotion, but may
teach us something very important: we recognize what is relevant when we
perceive that it is at stake. Under this respect, fear may be assumed as a guide
to responsibility, a virtue that is becoming increasingly important, because of the
role played by human technology in the current ecological crisis. Secondly, fear
and responsibility concern both dimensions of human action: private-individual
and public-collective. What the ‘heuristics of fear’ teaches us, is to become aware
of a deeper ambivalence, namely the one which characterizes as such human
freedom, which may aim to good or bad, to self-preservation or self-destruction.
Any public discussion concerning political or economic issues related with human
action (at an individual or collective level) ought not to leave this essential idea
out of consideration.
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1. Introduction. In Search of an Ethics for the Technological 
Age For	   several	   reasons	   our	   present	   day	   civilization	   has	   become	   increasingly	  complex.	   Indeed,	   complexity	   seems	   to	   be	   one	   of	   the	   most	   eloquent	  characteristics	   which	   unifies	   several	   aspects	   of	   today’s	   world,	   such	   as	  epistemology,	   science,	   technology,	   politics,	   economy,	   culture,	   society,	   and	   so	  on.	   Complexity	   as	   the	   result	   of	   the	   modern	   age	   or	   as	   its	   greatest	   creation.	  However,	  complexity	  has	  also	  highlighted	  the	  intrinsic	  limits	  of	  modernity:	  as	  such,	   its	   scientific	   method	   and	   its	   gnoseological	   claim	   to	   simplicity,	  abstraction,	  and	  reductionism	  have	  become	  inadequate	  in	  comprehending	  and	  reacting	   to	   phenomena	   which	   emerged	   during	   the	   closing	   decades	   of	   the	  twentieth	   century,	   such	   as	   globalization,	   financial	   emergencies,	   ecological	  crisis,	  bioethical	  issues	  etc.	  What	  is	  worse,	  until	  recently	  modernity	  has	  simply	  ignored	  the	  extent	  of	  human	  technological	  action	  upon	  these	  events.	  What	   is	  now	  at	  stake	  is	  not	  only	  modernity’s	   legitimacy	  in	  relation	  to	  previous	  eras,	  nor	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  has	  allegedly	  come	  to	  a	  dead	  end	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  overcome1.	  Far	  beyond	  these	  theoretical	  questions,	  what	  is	  now	  urgent	  is	   –	   to	  quote	  Hans	   Jonas	  –	   to	  go	   in	   “search	  of	   an	  ethics	   for	   the	   technological	  age”2.	  	  This	  is	  indeed	  a	  delicate	  task,	  since	  what	  is	  required	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  technology	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  present	  day	  complexity,	  which	  is	  to	  be	  assumed	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  times	  and	  an	  opportunity	  for	  reflecting	  upon	  the	  meaning	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  individual	  and	  collective	  action3.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  the	  debate	  on	  modernity’s	   legitimacy,	  see	   for	  example	  Löwith	  1949;	  Heidegger	  1954;	  Koselleck	  1979;	  Del	  Noce	  1964;	  Del	  Noce	  1970;	  Blumenberg	  1983;	  Jonas	  1966;	  Jonas	  1974;	  Jonas	  1984a;	  Severino	  1971;	  Severino	  1979	  (see	  also:	  Giddens	  1990).	  2	  	  See	  the	  subtitle	  of:	  (Jonas	  1984a).	  3	  Against	   the	   abstractness	   of	   Cartesianism	  and	   against	   its	   ideology	   of	   simplification,	  complexity	   is	   able	   to	   gain	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   comprehension	   of	   reality.	   In	   terms	   of	  complexity,	   knowledge	   is	  not	  only	   the	   result	  of	   a	   theoretical	  operation,	  but	   involves	  the	   whole	   range	   of	   human	   capacities,	   that	   is	   praxis,	   emotions,	   imagination,	  creativeness,	   care,	   dialogue,	   critical	   thinking,	   multi-­‐logical	   thinking	   etc.	   See:	   Morin	  1991;	  Lipman	  1995;	  Lipman	  2003.	  On	  the	  notion	  of	  complexity	  in	  relation	  to	  politics,	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As	   shown	   in	   Hans	   Jonas’	   Imperative	   of	   Responsibility,	   twentieth	  century’s	   technological	   development	   marks	   the	   peak	   of	   three	   centuries	   of	  generalized	  progress	  and	  advancement	  of	  the	  Western	  societies4.	  However,	  in	  the	   last	   century	   Jonas	   believes	   that	   this	   overall	   trend	   in	   mankind’s	  achievement	  has	  reached	  unheard-­‐of	  levels	  in	  the	  exploitation	  of	  nature.	  One	  of	  the	  aims	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  indiscriminate	  programme	  to	  rule	  over	  any	  form	  of	  life	  and	  to	  reduce	  life	  to	  an	  “artificial	  phenomenon”5.	  Hans	   Jonas6	   shows	   that	   today’s	   technology	   –	   with	   its	   “Promethean	  power”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  x)	  –	  has	  achieved	  such	  results	  by	  means	  of	  a	  qualitative	  transformation.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   able	   to	   generate	   worldwide	   effects,	   and	   only	  recently	   has	   humankind	   started	   to	   gain	   awareness	   of	   the	   cumulative	   and	  irreversible	   character	   of	   such	   effects	   on	   ecological	   equilibriums	   (see:	   Jonas	  1984a,	  Ch.	  1).	  However,	  problems	  raised	  by	  technology	  are	  not	  only	  limited	  to	  ecological	   issues.	   The	  possibility	   of	   achieving	   forms	  of	  manipulation,	   control	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  globalization	   and	   fear,	   see	   also:	   Beck	   1992;	   Giddens	   1990;	   Bodei	   1991a;	   Bauman	  1992;	  Bauman	  1999;	  Beck	  1999;	  Marramao	  2003;	  Pulcini	  2013.	  4	  Among	  other	  philosophers	  who	  reflect	  on	  these	  topics	  from	  a	  critical	  perspective,	  I	  can	   mention	   O.	   Spengler,	   M.	   Heidegger,	   E.	   Jünger,	   J.	   Ortega	   y	   Gasset,	   G.	   Anders,	   B.	  Croce,	  H.	  Arendt,	  E.	  Severino,	  J.	  Rawls,	  A.	  Naess	  etc.	  (see:	  Nacci	  2000).	  5	  See	  for	  instance	  the	  beginning	  of	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  The	  Human	  Condition:	   ‘The	  earth	  is	  the	  very	  quintessence	  of	  the	  human	  condition,	  and	  earthly	  nature,	  for	  all	  we	  know,	  may	  be	  unique	  in	  the	  universe	  in	  providing	  human	  beings	  with	  a	  habitat	  in	  which	  they	  can	  move	  and	  breathe	  without	  effort	  and	  without	  artifice.	  The	  human	  artifice	  of	   the	  world	  separates	  human	  existence	  from	  all	  mere	  animal	  environment,	  but	  life	  itself	   is	  outside	   this	   artificial	  world,	   and	   through	   life	  man	   remains	   related	   to	  all	   other	   living	  organisms.	  For	  some	  time	  now,	  a	  great	  many	  scientific	  endeavors	  have	  been	  directed	  toward	  making	  life	  so	  “artificial”,	  toward	  cutting	  the	  last	  tie	  through	  which	  even	  man	  belongs	   among	   the	   children	   of	   nature.	   It	   is	   the	   same	   desire	   to	   escape	   from	  imprisonment	  to	  the	  earth	  that	  is	  manifest	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  create	  life	  in	  the	  test	  tube’	  (Arendt	  1958,	  2).	  6	   Hans	   Jonas	   (1903-­‐1993)	   was	   a	   philosopher	   of	   Jewish	   origins.	   In	   the	   1920s	   he	  attended	   the	   universities	   of	   Freiburg	   and	  Marburg,	   and	   studied	  with	   E.	   Husserl,	   M.	  Heidegger,	   and	   R.	   Bultmann.	   His	   earlier	   research	   focused	   on	   the	   topic	   of	   Ancient	  Gnosis,	   which	   Jonas	   interpreted	   in	   the	   light	   of	   Heidegger’s	   existentialism.	   However,	  afterwards	   Jonas	  started	  to	  doubt	  about	   the	  validity	  of	  his	   teacher’s	  philosophy.	  The	  break	   became	   even	   deeper	   in	   1933,	   when	   Jonas	   emigrated	   from	   Germany,	   while	  Heidegger	   joined	  the	  Nazi	  party.	   In	  1939	   Jonas	  resolved	  to	   fight	   in	   the	  English	  army	  against	  Nazi	  Germany.	  After	  the	  war	  he	  tried	  to	  settle	  in	  Palestine,	  but	  then	  decided	  to	  move	  with	  his	  family	  to	  Canada.	  He	  started	  a	  new	  life,	  and	  also	  his	  research	  changed	  address.	   Jonas	   developed	   a	   philosophy	   of	   life,	   which	  was	   to	   overcome	   the	   limits	   of	  Modernity	  and	  of	   its	  dualistic	  and	  nihilistic	   interpretation	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	   life.	  After	  moving	  to	  New	  York,	  where	  in	  1953	  he	  found	  a	  post	  at	  the	  New	  School	  for	  Social	  Research,	   he	   developed	   the	   ethical	   and	   political	   consequences	   of	   his	   ‘biological	  philosophy’	   (see	   Jonas,	   Phenomenon	   of	   Life).	   However,	   only	   in	   1979	   his	   ethical	  thinking	  found	  a	  more	  complete	  form	  in	  Das	  Prinzip	  Verantwortung	  (The	  Imperative	  of	  
Responsibility),	  the	  first	  book	  he	  wrote	  in	  German	  after	  leaving	  Germany	  in	  the	  1930s.	  
Das	  Prinzip	  Verantwortung	  signs	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  third	  period	  of	   Jonas’	   thinking,	  the	  aim	  of	  which	  is	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  ethical	  consequences	  of	  human	  technology	  on	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  life.	  See:	  Jonas	  2008.	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or	   power	   on	   human	   and	   non-­‐human	   life	   clearly	   gives	   rise	   to	   fundamental	  political	  and	  bio-­‐political,	  economic,	  scientific,	  ethical	  and	  bio-­‐ethical	  issues.	  In	   Jonas’	   perspective	   these	   enquiries	   are	   embedded	   in	   an	   overall	  ontological	  horizon,	  which	  posits	  being	  “absolutely	  as	   the	  better	  over	  against	  nonbeing”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  81)	  and	  therefore	  as	  a	  value,	  and	  postulates	  that	  the	  capacity	  to	  have	  purposes	   is	  real,	   is	   ‘a	  good-­‐in-­‐itself’	  and	  therefore	   is	  a	  value	  (see:	  Jonas	  1984a,	  80,	  also	  Ch.	  3	  and	  Ch.	  4;	  also:	  Jonas	  1966;	  Franzini	  Tibaldeo	  2009).	  According	  to	  Jonas	  this	  “ontological	  axiom”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  80)	  provides	  the	  foundation	  of	  human	  action	  and	  is	  therefore	  able	  to	  indicate	  the	  limits	  of	  technological	  activities.	  However,	   apart	   from	   these	   ontological	   considerations,	   what	   is	  interesting	   is	   that	   Jonas’	   ‘ethics	   for	   the	   technological	   age’	   takes	   the	   peculiar	  shape	   of	   an	   ethics	   of	   responsibility,	   whose	   main	   characteristics	   are	   the	  intrinsic	   relationship	   between	   freedom	   and	   responsibility	   and	   the	   so	   called	  ‘heuristics	   of	   fear’.	   Indeed,	   according	   to	   Jonas,	   the	   fear	   for	   the	   survival	   of	  worldly	   life	   might	   be	   of	   great	   help	   in	   investigating	   the	   possibilities-­‐for	   and	  limits-­‐to	  technological	  action.	  
2. Hans Jonas’ Ethics of Responsibility According	   to	   Jonas,	   human	   beings	   experience	   freedom	   by	   gaining	  consciousness	  of	   the	   fact	   they	  have	   (or	  can	  have)	  power	  over	   reality.	  Hence,	  man	  experiments	  the	  unity	  of	   freedom	  and	  responsibility.	   In	  addition	  to	  this,	  human	  beings	  apply	  their	  power	  over	  reality	  with	  the	  mediation	  of	  knowledge	  and	  free	  will	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  129-­‐130;	  also	  Jonas	  1966).	  However,	   the	   development	   of	   technology	   seems	   to	   lead	   human	  freedom	   into	   temptation.	   Technology	   –	   believes	   Jonas	   –	   deludes	   human	  freedom	  with	  two	  false	  promises.	  The	  first	  is	  almightiness,	  thanks	  to	  which	  all	  humans	   can	   easily	   realize	   whatever	   they	   desire.	   The	   second	   is	   innocence,	  thanks	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   technology	   actually	   separates	   freedom	   from	  responsibility,	  and	   fails	   to	  provide	  human	   liberty	  with	   the	  due	  consideration	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  its	  own	  deeds7.	  The	   opposing	   issues	   of	   the	   ontological	   axiom	   and	   the	   recent	  technological	   threat	  persuade	   Jonas	   to	  meditate	  on	   the	   complex	   relationship	  between	   freedom	   and	   responsibility,	   in	   order	   not	   to	   accomplish	   what	   is	  
inadmissible	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  280-­‐281).	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  Jonas	  grants	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	   Concerning	   being	   responsible,	   Jonas	   writes:	   “To	   be	   de	   facto	   responsible	   in	   some	  respect	  for	  someone	  at	  some	  time	  ...	  belongs	  as	  inseparably	  to	  the	  being	  of	  man	  as	  his	  
a	  priori	  capacity	  for	  it	  –	  as	  inseparably	  indeed	  as	  his	  being	  a	  speaking	  creature	  –	  and	  is	  therefore	  to	  be	  included	  in	  his	  definition	  ...	  In	  this	  sense	  an	  “ought”	  is	  concretely	  given	  with	   the	   very	   existence	   of	   man;	   the	   mere	   property	   of	   being	   a	   causative	   subject	  involves	  of	   itself	  objective	  obligation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  external	  responsibility.	  With	  this,	  he	  is	  not	  yet	  moral,	  but	  a	  member	  of	  the	  moral	  order,	  that	  is,	  one	  who	  can	  be	  moral	  or	  immoral”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  99).	  
The Heuristics of Fear 
 	  
228	  	  
a	  privilege	  to	  actions	  which	  present	  themselves	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  “responsibility	  for	  the	  welfare	  of	  others”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  92).	  The	  essence	  and	  the	  goal	  of	  such	  acts	  is	  indeed	  nothing	  else	  but	  the	  other’s	  happiness	  as	  such.	  This	   is	   the	   way	   by	   which	   ‘power	   in	   its	   transitive	   causality	   becomes	  committed,	   and	   committed	   in	   the	   double	   sense	   of	   being	   objectively	  responsible	   for	  what	   is	   thus	  entrusted	   to	   it,	  and	   affectively	   engaged	   through	  the	  feeling	  that	  sides	  with	  it,	  namely,	  “feeling	  responsible”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  92).	  Hence,	   responsibility	   means	   that	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   others	   depends	   to	   some	  extent	  on	  the	  power	  of	  my	  freedom.	  The	  intrinsic	  value	  of	  this	  goal	  is	  of	  course	  independent	  from	  me.	  But	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  realization	  may	  also	  depend	  on	  my	  power	  makes	  it	  at	  the	  same	  time	  something	  belonging	  to	  my	  concern.	  Jonas	  believes	  that	  the	  ontological	  axiom	  cries	  out	  to	  man.	  The	  outcry	  addresses	   the	   hendiadys	   of	   freedom	   and	   responsibility,	   and	   demands	   an	  answer	  from	  man.	  The	  ontological	  axiom	  shows	  its	  ethical	  relevance	  by	  acting	  as	  a	  prudential	  moral	   law	  on	  human	  freedom,	  which	  has	  the	  responsibility	  of	  
willingly	   ensuring	   self-­‐discipline,	   self-­‐control,	   and	   self-­‐limitation	  of	   its	  power	  (see:	  Jonas	  1984a,	  129-­‐130)8	  If	  this	  does	  not	  happen,	  because	  of	  the	  reluctance	  to	  value	  natural	  and	  ecological	  limitations,	  the	  subject	  of	  freedom	  vanishes.	  As	  a	   consequence,	   freedom,	   responsibility	   or	   any	   kind	   of	   value	   are	   nothing	   but	  
flatus	   vocis.	   For	   this	   very	   reason	   Jonas	  points	   out	   the	   following	   fundamental	  moral	  duty:	  
... the	  existence	  of	  mankind	  comes	   first,	  whether	  deserved	  on	   its	  past	   record	   and	   its	   likely	   continuation	   or	   not.	   It	   is	   the	   ever-­‐transcendent	   possibility,	   obligatory	   in	   itself,	  which	  must	   be	   kept	  open	  by	  the	  continued	  existence.	  To	  preserve	  this	  possibility	   is	  a	  cosmic	   responsibility	   –	   hence	   the	   duty	   for	  mankind	   to	   exist.	   Put	  epigrammatically:	   the	   possibility	   of	   there	   being	   responsibility	   in	  the	  world,	  which	  is	  bound	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  men,	  is	  of	  all	  objects	  of	  responsibility	  the	  first	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  99).	  However,	   there	   is	   no	   way	   of	   being	   assured	   a	   priori	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   human	  behaviour,	   whether	   individual	   and	   collective,	   will	   succeed	   in	   respecting	   the	  ontological	   axiom.	   Since	   freedom	   is	   an	   essentially	   open,	   risky	   and	  
unforeseeable	   adventure,	   there	   is	   no	   guarantee	   that	   the	   power	   of	   human	  freedom	  will	  actually	  succeed	  in	  protecting	  life	  and	  its	  ontological	  value.	  Quite	  the	  opposite,	   it	  seems	  that	  because	  of	   its	  technological	  strengthening,	  human	  power	   easily	   and	   quickly	   generates	   ambivalent	   effects,	   or	   produces	  consequences	  which	  may	  doom	  humanity.	  According	   to	   Jonas,	   the	   threat	   is	   real	   and	   tangible.	   Because	   of	   the	  significance	  of	  the	  prize	  at	  stake,	  Jonas	  prefers	  to	  give	  priority	  to	  “the	  Bad	  over	  the	  Good	  Prognosis”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  31).	  He	  also	  firmly	  claims	  that	  the	  central	  issues	   be	   raised,	   that	   adequate	   priorities	   for	   action	   be	   chosen,	   and	   –	  what’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  According	  to	  Paul	  Ricoeur	  the	  virtue	  of	  prudence	  suggested	  by	  Jonas	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  Greek	  notion	  of	  phronesis	  (Ricoeur	  1994,	  44-­‐48).	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more	  –	  that	  the	  temptation	  of	  employing	  ideology	  to	  escape	  responsibilities	  be	  set	   aside.	  As	   examples	   of	   such	   a	   negative	   use	   of	   ideology,	   Jonas	   chooses	   the	  “political	   eschatologies	   of	   history”	   or	   “the	   non-­‐political	   belief	   in	   endless	  progress”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  109).	  In	  both	  cases	  technology	  has	  been	  adopted	  as	  a	  device	  for	  fulfilling	  positive	  aims	  (in	  politics,	  economics,	  society	  etc.).	  At	  least,	  this	  is	  what	  their	  worshippers	  believed.	  However,	  according	  to	  Jonas	  this	  is	  a	  wholly	  misled	  belief.	  The	  fact	  is	  that	  –	  as	  brilliantly	  shown	  in	  The	  Phenomenon	  
of	   Life	   –	   technology	   overthrows	   the	   goals	   of	   human	   action:	   the	   desired	  goal	  becomes	   a	   means	   subjected	   to	   the	   self-­‐perpetuation	   of	   the	   technological	  system	   as	   such	   (see:	   Jonas	   1966,	   188-­‐210)9.	   Moreover,	   this	   causes	   a	  dangerous	  alteration	   in	  ontology	  and	   the	   fact	   that	   its	  practical	  consequences	  remain	  almost	  veiled.	  
3. Fear as a Guide to Responsibility At	   this	   point	   of	   the	   discussion	   Jonas	   introduces	   the	   expression	   of	   the	  “heuristics	  of	  fear”,	  with	  which	  he	  states	  the	  amplified	  relevance	  for	  ethics	  of	  the	   “revulsion	   of	   feeling	   which	   acts	   ahead	   of	   knowledge,	   to	   apprehend	   the	  value	  whose	  antithesis	  so	  affects	  us.	  We	  know	  the	  thing	  at	  stake	  only	  when	  we	  
know	  that	  it	  is	  at	  stake”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  27;	  see	  also:	  Spinelli,	  Verde	  2011).	  And	  he	   continues	   as	   follows:	   “We	  know	  much	   sooner	  what	  we	  do	  not	  want	   than	  what	  we	  want.	   Therefore,	  moral	   philosophy	  must	   consult	   our	   fears	   prior	   to	  our	  wishes	  to	  learn	  what	  we	  really	  cherish”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  27).	  However,	  Jonas	  adds	   that	   the	  heuristics	  of	   fear	  ought	  only	   to	  recover	  an	  adequate	  emotional	  motive	   for	   acting	   responsibly	   in	   the	   face	   of	   current	   ethical	   dilemmas:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  In	  this	  chapter	  Jonas	  considers	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  modern	  knowledge	  of	  nature.	  He	  quotes	  F.	  Bacon’s	   idea	  that	  “knowledge	  must	  deliver	  man	  from	  the	  yoke	  of	  necessity	  by	  meeting	  necessity	  on	   its	   ground,	   and	  achieves	   freedom	   for	  him	  by	  delivering	   the	  things	   into	  his	  power”	  (Jonas	  1966,	  192).	  This	   is	  precisely	  what	  modern	  science	  and	  technology	   have	   tried	   to	   realize,	   thanks	   to	   their	   methodological	   reductionism	   and	  quantitative	   interpretation	   of	   being.	   As	   a	   result,	   ‘the	   modern	   knowledge	   of	   nature,	  very	   unlike	   the	   classical	   one,	   is	   a	   “know-­‐how”	   and	   not	   a	   “know-­‐what,”	   and	   on	   this	  basis	   it	  makes	  good	  Bacon’s	  contention	  that	  knowledge	   is	  power’	   (Jonas	  1966,	  204).	  Any	   question	   concerning	   the	   “meaning”	   of	   being,	   or	   its	   “value”,	   is	   –	   therefore	   –	  considered	  unworthy.	  All	  that	  matters,	  is	  to	  gain	  power	  over	  reality	  and	  to	  dominate	  it	  with	   science	   and	   technology.	   “But	   –	   writes	   Jonas	   –	   if	   ever	   we	   entrust	   or	   resign	  ourselves	   wholly	   to	   the	   self-­‐corrective	   mechanics	   of	   the	   interplay	   of	   science	   and	  technology,	   we	   shall	   have	   lost	   the	   battle	   for	   man.	   For	   science,	   with	   its	   application	  governed	  solely	  by	  its	  own	  logic,	  does	  not	  really	  leave	  the	  meaning	  of	  happiness	  open:	  it	  has	  prejudged	  the	  issue,	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  own	  value-­‐freedom.	  The	  automatism	  of	  its	  use	  –	  insofar	  as	  this	  use	  carries	  beyond	  the	  recurrent	  meeting	  of	  the	  recurrent	  emergency	  created	  by	  itself	  –	  has	  set	  the	  goal	  of	  happiness	  in	  principle:	  indulgence	  in	  the	  use	  of	  things.	  Between	   the	   two	  poles	  of	   emergency	  and	   indulgence,	  of	   resourcefulness	  and	  hedonism,	  set	  up	  by	  the	  ever-­‐expanding	  power	  over	  things,	  the	  direction	  of	  all	  effort	  and	   thereby	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   good	   tends	   to	   be	   predecided.	   But	  we	  must	   not	   let	   that	  issue	  be	  decided	  by	  default”	  (Jonas	  1966,	  208-­‐209).	  As	  for	  the	  modern	  methodological	  reductionism	  (see:	  Wolters	  2010).	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“although,	  in	  consequence,	  the	  heuristics	  of	  fear	  is	  surely	  not	  the	  last	  word	  in	  the	   search	   for	   goodness,	   it	   is	   at	   least	   an	   extremely	   useful	   first	  word”	   (Jonas	  1984a,	  27)10.	  For	  humankind	  the	  fear	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  life	  on	  Earth	  becomes	  a	  way	  of	  gaining	  consciousness	  about	   the	  excessive	  precariousness	  and	  risks	  of	   the	  present	   era11.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   fear	   elucidates	   the	   possible	   relationship	  between	   irresponsibility	   and	   the	   human	   technical	   project.	   Since	   technology	  turns	  human	  action	  into	  an	   irresponsible	  excess	  of	  action	  (indeed,	  “Dynamism	  is	   the	  signature	  of	  modernity”)	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  119),	   Jonas,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  believes	   that	   an	   ethics	   of	   responsibility	   ought	   to	   preserve	   “the	   heritage	   of	   a	  past	   evolution”	   (Jonas	   1984a,	   32),	   whose	   ontological	   value	   was	   intensely	  analyzed	  by	  the	  “biological	  philosophy”	  highlighted	  in	  The	  Phenomenon	  of	  Life.	  Jonas	   insists	   on	   the	   essential	   solidarity	   of	   human	   life	   with	   the	   general	  phenomenon	   of	   life.	   The	   complex	   dynamics	   of	   life’s	   evolution	   has	   an	  ontological,	  transcendent	  and	  metaphysical	  meaning,	  and	  so	  the	  humanity	  –	  as	  part	   of	   that	   overall	   adventure	   and	   evolution	   –	   has	   the	   “supreme	   duty	   to	  preserve	   it	   intact”	   (Jonas	   1984a,	   33;	   see:	   Jonas	   1984a,	   119-­‐122,	   127-­‐129;	  Jonas	   1985;	   Frogneux	   2001,	   Franzini	   Tibaldeo	   2009).	   As	   a	   consequence,	  mankind	   today	   is	   committed	   to	   acting	   so	   that	   humankind	   tomorrow	  will	   be	  able	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  outcry	  of	  terrestrial	  life,	  that	  is,	  it	  will	  be	  able	  to	  assume	  the	  ontological	  duty	  of	  responsibility.	  So	  this	  is	  our	  current	  obligation	  towards	  future	  mankind:	  This	  means,	  in	  turn,	  that	  it	  is	  less	  the	  right	  of	  future	  men	  (namely,	  their	   right	   to	   happiness,	   which,	   given	   the	   uncertain	   concept	   of	  ‘happiness’,	   would	   be	   a	   precarious	   criterion	   anyway)	   than	   their	  duty	  over	  which	  we	  have	  to	  watch,	  namely,	  their	  duty	  to	  be	  truly	  human:	   thus	   over	   their	   capacity	   for	   this	   duty	   –	   the	   capacity	   to	  even	   attribute	   it	   to	   themselves	   at	   all	   –	   which	  we	   could	   possibly	  rob	   them	  of	  with	   the	   alchemy	  of	   our	   ‘utopian’	   technology	   )Jonas	  1984a,	  42).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  See	  also	  the	  following	  extract	  from	  The	  Phenomenon	  of	  Life,	  in	  which	  Jonas	  suggests	  how	  to	   face	  problems	  generated	  by	  an	  uncritical	  use	  of	   technology:	   “Thus	  even	  with	  the	  pressure	  of	  emergencies	  upon	  us	  we	  need	  a	  view	  beyond	  them	  to	  meet	  them	  on	  more	   than	   their	   own	   terms.	   Their	   very	   diagnosis	   (wherever	   it	   is	   not	   a	   case	   of	  extremity)	   implies	   at	   least	   an	   idea	   of	   what	   would	   not	   be	   an	   emergency,	   as	   that	   of	  sickness	   implies	   the	   idea	   of	   health;	   and	   the	   anticipation	   of	   success	   inherent	   in	   all	  struggle	  against	  danger,	  misery,	  and	  injustice	  must	  face	  the	  question	  of	  what	  life	  befits	  man”	   (Jonas	   1966,	   209).	   See	   also:	   Jonas	   1985,	   Ch.	   3.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   notice	   that,	  according	  to	   Jonas,	   the	   imperative	  of	  responsibility	   is	  absolutely	  not	  grounded	   in	  the	  heuristics	   of	   fear	   (as	   erroneously	   stated,	   for	   instance,	   by	  Denis	  Müller	   –	   see:	  Müller	  1993,	  223-­‐35),	  but	  in	  an	  overall	  ontological	  theory	  of	  responsibility.	  11	   The	   relevance	   of	   Jonas’	   “heuristic	   of	   fear”	   to	   understanding	   vulnerability	  transformations	   related	   to	   technology	   has	   been	   recently	   underlined	   by	   Mark	  Coeckelbergh	  (2013,	  102).	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At	   first	   sight,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  prophecy	  of	   doom	  which	   accompanies	   Jonas’	  
heuristics	   of	   fear	   casts	   a	   pessimistic	   light	   on	   his	   reflections.	  However,	   this	   is	  not	   the	   case.	   Instead,	   Jonas	   never	   stops	   repeating	   that	   negative	   prophecy	   is	  always	  made	  “to	  avert	  its	  coming”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  120).	  Because	  of	  his	  criticism	  of	  contemporary	  technology,	  Jonas	  cannot	  be	  considered	  a	  prophet	  of	  doom,	  a	  reactionary	  or	  an	  opponent	  of	  progress12.	  On	   the	   contrary,	   I	  believe	   that	   the	  meaning	   of	   Jonas’	   claim	   for	   responsibility	   essentially	   consists	   of	   his	   will	   to	  highlight	   the	   basic	   ambiguity	   of	   human	   freedom.	   Due	   to	   this	   characteristic,	  freedom	  is	  open	  to	  good,	  but	  also	  to	  bad;	  it	  may	  welcome	  and	  respect	  the	  bond	  of	  ontological	  value,	  but	  it	  may	  also	  choose	  to	  violate	  or	  ignore	  that	  very	  same	  value.	   The	  ambivalence	  of	  freedom	  is	  man’s	  most	  specific	  feature.	  According	  to	   Jonas,	  man	   is	   truly	   ambiguous,	   and	   so	   today’s	  homo	   technologicus	   cannot	  but	  be	  ambiguous.	   In	   this	   respect,	   Jonas	  warns	   that	  humankind	  waits	   for	  no	  utopian	   improvement,	  unlike	   those	   ideologies	  and	  utopias	   that	  claim	  to	   fight	  for	  anthropological	  enhancement	  (see:	  Jonas	  1984a,	  200-­‐201,	  383-­‐384)13.	  The	  ethics	   of	   responsibility	   offers	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   hope.	   Indeed,	   “hope	   is	   a	  condition	   for	  action”	   (Jonas	  1984b,	  391)	  and	  a	  heuristics	  of	   fear	  ought	   to	  be	  used	  “in	  counterbalance	  to	  a	  heuristics	  of	  hope”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  203).	  However,	  the	   ethics	   of	   responsibility	   gives	   fear	   “its	   rightful	   place”:	   “There	   are	   times	   –	  continues	  Jonas	  –	  when	  the	  drive	  needs	  moral	  encouragement,	  when	  hope	  and	  daring	   rather	   than	   fear	   and	   caution	   should	   lead.	   Ours	   is	   not	   one	   of	   them”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  203).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  fear	  ought	  not	  grow	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  action	   becomes	   paralyzed.	   A	   correct	   interpretation	   of	   fear	   –	   states	   Jonas	   –	  ought	   to	   inspire	   the	   ‘courage	  of	   responsibility’,	  which	   takes	  care	  of	  an	  object	  whose	   existence	  depends	   on	  man’s	   ability	   to	   act	  with	  wisdom,	   resoluteness,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  On	   the	   contrary,	   Jonas	  declares	   that	   ethics	   ought	   to	   preserve	   those	   values	   and	   to	  prevent	   falling	   into	  a	   lifeboat	   situation	   (see:	   Jonas	  1985).	  However,	   this	   aspect	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  perceived	  by	  scholars	  who	  believe	  that	  Jonas’	  ethics	  is	  antidemocratic	  and	   in	   favour	   of	   eco-­‐tyranny.	   See,	   among	   others:	   Landkammer	   1990,	   423-­‐9;	  Wolin	  2001,	  123;	  Frogneux	  2007;	  Seidel	  &	  Endruweit	  2007.	  13	  In	  the	  last	  chapter	  of	  The	  Imperative	  of	  Responsibility	  Jonas	  offers	  harsh	  criticism	  of	  Ernst	   Bloch’s	  Das	   Prinzip	   Hoffnung	   (1959)	   and	   of	   his	   ontology	   of	   ‘not-­‐yet’.	   Indeed,	  according	   to	   Jonas,	   the	   main	   risk	   is	   that	   such	   ontology	   may	   ally	   itself	   with	   the	  technological	   and	   Baconian	   ideal	   (see:	   Jonas	   1984a,	   142-­‐3,	   192-­‐200).	   However,	  afterwards	   Jonas	  admitted	   that	  his	   criticism	  had	  been	   too	  harsh.	  The	  point	  was	   that	  Jonas	   was	   frightened	   that	   the	   Blochian	   philosophy	   could	   be	   subdued	   to	   political	  movements	  (see:	  Jonas	  1991,	  132-­‐3;	  Becchi	  2000,	  17-­‐18).	  On	  the	  relationship	  between	  Jonas	   and	   Bloch,	   see:	   Bodei	   1991b,	   5-­‐13;	   Bodei	   1991c,	   231-­‐234.	   As	   for	   currently	  debated	   topics	   like	   human	   enhancement	   and	   transhumanism,	   Jonas’	   reflections	   are	  highly	   critical	   of	   their	   melioristic	   fervour	   and	   neglect	   of	   the	   risks	   related	   to	   the	  irreversibility	   of	   technological	   interventions,	   leading	   to	   consequences	  which	   cannot	  be	   controlled	   (see:	   Jonas	   1974b,	   143-­‐5;	   Habermas	   2003,	   62-­‐3).	   Vice	   versa,	   the	  transhumanist	   philosopher	   Nick	   Bostrom	   criticises	   both	   Jonas	   and	   Habermas	   as	  conservative	   thinkers	   (Bostrom	   2005a,	   33-­‐46;	   Bostrom	   2005b,	   1-­‐25).	   See	   as	   well:	  Gammel	  2013,	  239-­‐267.	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promptness,	   moderation,	   and	   circumspection	   (see:	   Jonas	   1984a,	   204;	   Jonas	  1984b,	   391;	   also:	   Pulcini	   2013)14.	   The	   vulnerable	   phenomenon	  of	   terrestrial	  life	  –	  into	  which	  human	  life	  is	  rooted	  –	  is	  such	  an	  object,	  and	  its	  perpetuation	  needs	   man’s	   attentive	   and	   active	   care.	   According	   to	   Jonas,	   this	   aim	   means	  more	  than	  the	  mere	  indication	  of	  actions	  not	  to	  be	  done.	  More	  than	  just	  this,	  human	   freedom	  ought	   to	   reflect	  positively	  on	   itself,	   on	   its	  own	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  and	  on	  the	  object	  of	  its	  responsibility	  –	  that	  is,	  life.	  The	  fragile	  and	  vulnerable	  object	  of	  responsibility	  calls	  for	  care.	  What	  precisely	   should	   human	   responsibility	   care	   for?	   Jonas	   answers	   that	   we	   are	  responsible	  for	  “the	  idea	  of	  Man,	  which	  is	  such	  that	  it	  demands	  the	  presence	  of	  its	  embodiment	  in	  the	  world”	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  43).	  The	  idea	  of	  man	  specifies	  the	  primary	  imperative	  for	  ethics	  and	  insists	  “equally	  on	  the	  that	  and	  the	  what	  of	  obligatory	   existence”	   (Jonas	   1984a,	   43;	   also:	   Jonas	   1966,	   106).	   According	   to	  Jonas,	   human	  beings	  personify	  one	  of	   the	  main	  ontological	   characteristics	  of	  life,	   namely	   its	   dynamic	   and	   self-­‐transcending	   development	   (see	   Jonas’	  biological	   philosophy	   in:	   Jonas	   1966).	   Human	   life	   is	   essentially	   open	   to	   the	  future	   and	   to	   self-­‐transcendence.	   This	   is	   the	   reason	   for	   which	   an	   “ought”	  filters	   through	   the	   “being”	  of	  human	   life:	   future	  actions	  ought	   to	   respect	   the	  fact	   that	   human	   freedom	   and	   life	   always	   express	   more	   than	   what,	   strictly	  speaking,	   is	   there.	   Individual	   and	   collective	   freedom	   ought	   never	   to	   put	   at	  stake	  the	  promise	  of	  future	  which	  expresses	  life’s	  ontological	  feature.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Jonas	  ends	  his	  masterpiece	  with	  an	  appeal	  to	  preserve	  the	  integrity	  of	  man’s	  essence,	  since	  “something	  sacred”	  discloses	  itself	  through	  humankind,	  something	  “inviolable	  under	  no	  circumstances	  (and	  which	  can	  be	  perceived	   independently	   from	   religion)”	   (Jonas	   1979,	   393).	   Against	   the	  triumphalism	   of	   utopian	   ideologies,	   Jonas	   reaffirms	   that	   humanity	  courageously	   accepts	   its	   demanding	   task	   of	   fulfilling	   freedom	   and	  responsibility:	  The	   time	   for	   the	  headlong	  race	  of	  progress	   is	  over,	  not	  of	   course	  for	   guarded	   progress	   itself.	   Humbled	   we	   may	   feel,	   but	   not	  humiliated.	   Man’s	   mandate	   remains	   exacting	   enough	   outside	   of	  paradise.	   To	  preserve	   the	   integrity	   of	   his	   essence,	  which	   implies	  that	   of	   his	   natural	   environment;	   to	   save	   this	   trust	   unstunted	  through	   the	   perils	   of	   the	   times,	   mostly	   the	   perils	   of	   his	   own	  overmighty	   deeds	   –	   this	   is	   not	   a	   utopian	   goal,	   but	   not	   so	   very	  modest	   a	   task	   of	   responsibility	   for	   the	   future	   of	   man	   on	   earth.	  (Jonas	  1984a,	  201-­‐202).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Although	   Jonas	   and	  Lars	   Svendsen	   (who	   recently	   published	  A	  Philosophy	   of	   Fear)	  share	  the	  aim	  of	  restoring	  the	  full	  meaning	  of	  human	  freedom	  and	  responsibility,	  they	  disagree	  about	   the	  role	  played	  by	   fear:	  while	  according	  to	   Jonas	   fear	  ought	   to	  play	  a	  constructive	  role,	  Svendsen	  is	  more	  critical	  and	  polemical.	  He	  believes	  that	  the	  proper	  question	  to	  be	  posed	  is:	  what	  role	  fear	  ought	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  play	  in	  our	  lives?	  (see:	  Svendsen	  2008).	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4. Conclusions The	   importance	   of	   Jonas’	   reflections	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   he	   points	   out	   the	  essential	   ambivalence	   of	   human	   freedom,	   and	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   he	   puts	   this	  feature	   in	   relation	   to	   modern	   technology.	   The	   risks	   connected	   to	   and	  generated	  by	  the	  massive	  employment	  of	  technology	  made	  Jonas	  sensitive	  to	  the	   idea	   of	   the	   preservation	   of	   life	   and	   of	   its	   value	   for	   human	   freedom.	  However,	   since	   technology	   is	   a	   product	   of	   human	   freedom,	   he	   also	   became	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  humanity	  ought	  to	  use	  its	  prerogatives	  cautiously.	  In	  this	  respect,	  fear	  may	  play	  an	  important	  role.	  In	  particular,	  as	   far	  as	  the	  ecological	  crisis	   is	  concerned,	   fear	  compels	  us	  to	  think	  no	  longer	  about	  human	  progress	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘increase’,	  but	  instead	  in	   terms	   of	   ‘responsibility’,	   ‘sobriety’,	   and	   ‘decrease’	   (for	   other	   reflections	  beyond	   Jonas	   on	   these	   themes,	   see:	   Passmore	   1974;	   Hösle	   1991;	   Latouche	  1995;	   Beck	   1999;	   Marramao	   2003).	   Jonas’	   Imperative	   of	   Responsibility	   adds	  something	   that	   is	  most	   important:	   any	  decision	  about	  new	  parameters	   to	  be	  adopted	  for	   individual	  and	  collective	  action	  ought	  never	  to	  forget	  respect	   for	  the	  essence	  of	  man	  –	  that	  is,	  freedom	  –	  and	  ought	  never	  to	  forget	  that	  freedom	  is	   indeed	   ambivalent.	   So,	   properly	   speaking,	   there	   is	   no	   guarantee	   that	  responsibility	  will	  effectively	  succeed	  in	  fighting	  against	  irresponsibility.	  Fear	  –	   argues	   Jonas	   –	   may	   therefore	   be	   very	   useful,	   since	   it	   may	   lead	   to	  responsibility	   and	   supply	   a	   first	   motive	   for	   responsible	   action.	   Moreover,	  negative	  prophecies	  and	   fear	  may	  offer	  powerful	  devices	   for	  ethical	   theories	  and	   practice.	   The	   strength	   of	   fear	   consists	   of	   its	   capacity	   to	   unify	   all	   the	  dimensions	   of	   the	   human	   being	   (individual	   and	   collective,	   rational	   and	  emotional,	   theoretical	   and	   practical	   etc.).	   Moreover,	   fear	   greatly	   intensifies	  imagination.	  Jonas	   talked	   also	   about	   the	   possibility	   of	   suspending	   democracy	   in	  order	   to	   face	   the	  problem	  of	   the	  survival	  of	  mankind.	  However,	   these	  words	  are	   provocative.	   He	   hints	   at	   eco-­‐tyranny	   only	   to	   say	   that	   that	   is	   what	  
absolutely	   and	   in	   any	   case	   ought	   to	   be	   avoided	   (see:	   Jonas	   1984a,	   150-­‐151,	  173-­‐174;	   Jonas	   1987).	   As	   shown	   above,	   respect	   for	   human	   freedom	   always	  comes	  first.	  And,	  secondly,	  fear	  is	  never	  to	  be	  used	  for	  ideological	  purposes,	  or	  for	  purposes	  which	  are	  harmful	  to	  freedom	  and	  its	  ambivalence.	  In	   the	   light	   of	   the	   previous	   speculation,	   however,	   there	   is	   a	   possible	  difficulty	   concerning	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   responsibly	   used	   fear	   in	   resolving	  problems	   such	   as	   the	   ecological	   crisis.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   is	   necessary	   for	  freedom	  to	  limit	  itself	  by	  containing	  the	  impact	  of	  its	  technological	  effects	  on	  nature,	  economy,	  society,	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  this	  respect,	  there	  certainly	  are	  slight	  signals	  that	  it	  is	  the	  democracies	  that	  are	  proceeding	  in	  this	  direction,	  despite	  hesitation,	  sluggishness,	  resistance,	  and	  contradictions.	  However,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   human	   freedom	   and	   the	   democratic	   handling	   of	   ecological	   politics	   do	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  sufficiently	  fulfilled	  their	  goals	  (see:	  Hösle	  1991).	  The	  risk	  is	   that	   for	   very	   many	   reasons	   –	   including	   a	   form	   of	   overall	   cultural	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backwardness	   in	  the	   face	  of	   the	  complexity	  of	  our	  era	  –	  human	  freedom	  and	  democracy	  fail	  their	  duty	  to	  propose	  farsighted	  actions	  to	  face	  adequately	  and	  effectively	   those	  global	  problems.	  Further	  problems	   could	  arise	   if	   this	  doubt	  were	   to	   spread	  among	  people	   and	  become	   frustration,	   or	   if	   it	  were	   to	   cause	  people	  to	  shut	  themselves	  in	  their	  own	  fear	  or	  interests,	  or	  finally	  if	  it	  were	  to	  set	  the	  premises	  for	  a	  generalized	  indifference	  toward	  public	  matters.	  In	  these	  cases	   the	   positive	   use	   of	   fear	   would	   probably	   be	   exploited	   and	   individual	  freedom	  would	  most	  likely	  opt	  for	  its	  irresponsible	  cupio	  dissolvi	  in	  face	  of	  the	  negative	  and	  terroristic	  use	  of	  fear	  by	  tyrannies	  or	  elitist	  democracies.15	  A	   possible	   answer	   to	   these	   contradictions	   ought	   to	   assume	   the	  complexity	   of	   our	   times,	   and	   ought	   to	   handle	   it	   through	   new	   processes	   and	  awareness.	   The	   ethical	   reflection	   based	   upon	   the	   idea	   of	   responsibility	   and	  assuming	  fear	  as	  a	  guide	  to	  responsible	  action	  may	  be	  very	  helpful.	  However,	  the	   philosophical	   analysis	   of	   the	   hendiadys	   of	   freedom	   and	   responsibility	  ought	  to	  be	  discussed	  not	  only	  from	  an	  individual	  point	  of	  view,	  but	  also	  in	  its	  public	   relevance.16	   Fear	   produces	   positive	   results	   if	   it	   is	   discussed	   in	   public	  and	   if	   its	  discussion	  concerns	  not	  only	   theoretical	  and	   formal	  matters,	  but	   is	  able	  to	  involve	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  person	  (practical,	  emotional,	  imaginative	  etc.).	  As	  a	  result,	  individuals	  may	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  fear	  is	  a	  question	  of	  public	  relevance,	  a	  question	  with	  which	  everyone’s	  happiness	  and	  realization	  is	  deeply	  intertwined.	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Abstract.	   The	   paper	   assumes	   that	   fear	   presents	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	  ambivalence.	   To	   say	   it	   with	   Hans	   Jonas	   (1903-­‐1993),	   fear	   is	   not	   only	   a	  negative	  emotion,	  but	  may	  teach	  us	  something	  very	   important:	  we	  recognize	  
what	   is	  relevant	  when	  we	  perceive	  that	   it	   is	  at	  stake.	  Under	  this	  respect,	  fear	  may	   be	   assumed	   as	   a	   guide	   to	   responsibility,	   a	   virtue	   that	   is	   becoming	  increasingly	  important,	  because	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	  human	  technology	  in	  the	  current	   ecological	   crisis.	   Secondly,	   fear	   and	   responsibility	   concern	   both	  dimensions	   of	   human	   action:	   private-­‐individual	   and	   public-­‐collective.	   What	  the	  ‘heuristics	  of	  fear’	  teaches	  us,	  is	  to	  become	  aware	  of	  a	  deeper	  ambivalence,	  namely	  the	  one	  which	  characterizes	  as	  such	  human	  freedom,	  which	  may	  aim	  to	  good	  or	  bad,	  to	  self-­‐preservation	  or	  self-­‐destruction.	  Any	  public	  discussion	  concerning	   political	   or	   economic	   issues	   related	   with	   human	   action	   (at	   an	  individual	   or	   collective	   level)	   ought	   not	   to	   leave	   this	   essential	   idea	   out	   of	  consideration.	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